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Novel Defense Strategy Against Zero-Dynamics Attack in Multi-Agent
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Abstract—This paper considers the defense strategy of strate-
gic topology switching for the second-order multi-agent system
under zero-dynamics attack (ZDA) whose attack-starting time is
allowed to be not the initial time. We first study the detectability
of ZDA, which is a sufficient and necessary condition of
switching topologies in detecting the attack. Based on the
detectability, a Luenberger observer under switching topology is
proposed to detect the stealthy attack. The primary advantages
of the attack-detection algorithm are twofold: (i) in detecting
ZDA, the algorithm allows the defender (system operator)
to have no knowledge of the attack-starting time and the
misbehaving agents (i.e., agents under attack); (ii) in tracking
system in the absence of attacks, Luenberger observer has no
constraint on the magnitudes of observer gains and the number
of observed outputs, i.e., only one agent’s observed output is
sufficient. Simulations are provided to verify the effectiveness
of the strategic topology-switching algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Coordination of multi-agent systems with the first-order
dynamics is a well-studied theoretical problem with many
practical applications. However, current and emerging sys-
tems, such as vehicle [1], spacecraft [2], robot [3] and
electrical power networks [4], rely on the second-order
dynamics. A second-order multi-agent system consists of a
population of n agents whose dynamics are governed by the
following equations:
x˙i (t) = vi (t) , (1a)
v˙i (t) = ui(t), i = 1, . . . , n (1b)
where xi(t) ∈ R is the position, vi(t) ∈ R is the ve-
locity, and ui(t) ∈ R is the local control input. Recently,
significant efforts have been devoted to the coordination
control of the second-order multi-agent system (1), see
e.g., flocking [5], velocity synchronization and regulation
of relative distances [6], decentralized formation control of
spacecrafts [7], and distributed continuous-time optimiza-
tion [8], etc. The numerous real networked systems that
can be represented by (1) and the broad applications of its
coordination control is the main motivation of this paper
considering the model (1). For coordination control, this
paper considers more representative average consensus.
Security concerns regarding networked cyber-physical sys-
tems pose an existential threat to their wide-deployment, see
e.g., Stuxnet malware attack and Maroochy Shire Council
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Sewage control incident [9]. The “networked” aspect exac-
erbates the difficulty of detecting and preventing aforemen-
tioned attacks since centralized measurement (sensing) and
control are not feasible for such large-scale systems [10], and
hence requires the development of decentralized approaches,
which are inherently prone to attacks. While developing de-
fense strategies for ZDA have recently gained interest [10]–
[14], the space of solutions is yet to be thoroughly explored.
The most prominent features of prior work are that they
constrain the connectivity of network topology and the
number of the misbehaving agents (referred to agents under
attack) [10]–[13] or require the knowledge of the number
of misbehaving agents and the attack-starting time at the
defender (system operator) side for attack detection [10]–
[12], [14]–[16]. The main objective of this work is to remove
such constraints and unrealistic assumptions by utilizing
a new approach for attack detection: intentional topology
switching.
Recent experiment of stealthy false-data injection attacks
on networked control system [15] showed the changes in the
system dynamics could be used to detect stealthy attack. To
have changes in the system dynamics to detect ZDA, Teixeira
et al. [15] proposed a method of modifying output matrix
through adding and removing observed measurements, or
modifying input matrix through adding and removing actua-
tors or perturbing the control input matrix. In more realistic
situation where the attack can exactly infer system dynamics
and attack-starting is designed to be not the initial time
and the defender (system operator) has no knowledge of
the attack-starting time, to detect ZDA the system dynamics
must have dynamic changes, i.e., some parameters of system
dynamics changes infinitely over infinite time.
For the dynamical networks, recent studies have high-
lighted the important role played by the network topology,
and in recent several years, actively/strategically topology
switching has received significantly attention in the control
theory, network science and graph theory literatures, see
e.g., Ciftcioglu et al. [17] studied dynamic topology design
in the adversary environment where the network designer
continually and strategically change network topology to
a denser state, while the adversary attempts to thwart the
defense strategy simultaneously. Moreover, driven by recent
developments in mobile computing, wireless communication,
sensing, etc., it is more feasible to set communication topol-
ogy as a control variable [18], [19]. These motivate us to
consider the method of topology switching such that the
multi-agent system can have changes in its system dynamics
to detect ZDA.
The strategy on switching times proposed in [20] will be
the building block of our defense strategy, which answered
the question: when the topology of network should switch
such that the occurring dynamic changes in system dynamics
do not undermine the agent’s ability of reaching consensus
in the absence of attacks. Based on the work in [20], this
paper focuses on the strategy on switching topologies that
addresses the problem of switching to what topologies to
detect ZDA.
The contribution of this paper is threefold, which can be
summarized as follows.
• The detectability of ZDA is obtained, which is a suffi-
cient and necessary condition of switching topologies.
• A sufficient and necessary condition of switching
topologies for Luenberger observer is derived, which
has no constraint on the number of observed outputs in
tracking real multi-agent system.
• Through employing Luenberger observer, a strategic
topology-switching algorithm for attack detection is
proposed. The advantages of the algorithm are: i) in
detecting ZDA, it allows the defender (system operator)
to have no knowledge of misbehaving agents and the
attack-starting time; ii) in tracking real systems in the
absence of attacks, it has no constraint on the magni-
tudes of observer gains and the number of observed
outputs.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Rn and Rm×n denote the set of n-dimensional real vectors
and the set of m×n-dimensional real matrices, respectively.
Let C denote the set of complex numbers. N represents
the set of the natural numbers and N0 = N ∪ {0}. Let
1n×n and 0n×n be the n × n-dimensional identity matrix
and zero matrix, respectively. 1n ∈ Rn and 0n ∈ Rn
denote the vector with all ones and the vector with all zeros,
respectively. For a matrixM ∈ Rn×n, λi (M) denotes its ith
eigenvalue. The superscript ‘⊤’ stands for matrix transpose.
ker (Q) , {y : Qy = 0n, Q ∈ Rn×n}. Also, |·| denotes the
cardinality of a set, or the modulus of a number. V\K
describes the complement set of K with respect to V. Q
denotes the set of rational numbers.
The interaction among n agents is modeled by an undi-
rected graph G , (V,E), where V , {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set
of vertices that represents n agents and E ⊆ V × V is the
set of edges of the graph G. The weighted adjacency matrix
A = [aij ] ∈ Rn×n of the graphG is defined as aij = aji > 0
if (i, j) ∈ E, and aij = aji = 0 otherwise. Assume that there
are no self-loops, i.e., for any i ∈ V, aii = 0. The Laplacian
matrix of graph G is defined as L , [lij ] ∈ Rn×n, where
lii ,
n∑
j=1
aij , and lij , −aij for i 6= j.
B. Attack Model
As a class of stealthy attacks, ZDA is hard to detect, iden-
tify, and then mitigate from a control theory perspective [21]–
[23]. Before reviewing its attack policy, let us first consider
the following system:
z˙ (t) = Az (t) , (2a)
y (t) = Cz (t) , (2b)
where z(t) ∈ Rn¯ and y(t) ∈ Rm¯ denote system state and
observed output, respectively; A ∈ Rn¯×n¯, C ∈ Rm¯×n¯. Its
corresponding version under attack is described by
˙˜z (t) = Az˜ (t) +Bg(t), (3a)
y˜ (t) = Cz˜ (t) +Dg(t), (3b)
where g(t) ∈ Ro¯ is attack signal, B ∈ Rn¯×o¯ andD ∈ Rm¯×o¯.
The policy of ZDA with introduction of attack-starting
time is presented in the following definition, which is differ-
ent from the attack policies studied in [10]–[12], [14]–[16],
whose attack-starting times are the initial time.
Definition 1: [24] The attack signal
g(t) =
{
geη(t−ρ), t ∈ [ρ,∞)
0o¯, t ∈ [0, ρ) (4)
in system (3) is a zero-dynamics attack, if 0n¯ 6= z˜(0)−z(0) ∈
Rn¯, 0o¯ 6= g(ρ) ∈ Ro¯, ρ ≥ 0 and η ∈ C satisfy
z˜ (0)− z (0)∈ker (O) if ρ > 0 (5a)[
eAρ (z˜ (0)− z (0))
−g (ρ)
]
∈ker
([
η1n¯×n¯ −A B
−C D
])
, (5b)
where
O ,
[
C⊤ (CA)
⊤
. . .
(
CAn¯−1
)⊤ ]⊤
. (6)
Moreover, the states and observed outputs of systems (3)
and (2) satisfy
y (t) = y˜ (t) , for all t ≥ 0 (7)
z˜ (t) =
{
eAtz˜ (0) , t ∈ [0, ρ]
z (t) + (z˜ (ρ)− z (ρ)) eη(t−ρ), t ∈ (ρ,∞) . (8)
Remark 1: Compared with other stealthy attacks, see e.g.,
replay attack [25] and covert attack [26], ZDA has more
explicit attack objectives. The state solution (8) shows that
through choosing the parameter η and also the attack-starting
time ρ, the attacker can achieve various objectives, see e.g.,
• ρ = ∞: altering the steady-state value while not
affecting system stability;
• ρ <∞, Re (η) > 0: making system unstable;
• ρ < ∞, Re (η) = 0, Im (η) 6= 0: causing oscillatory
behavior.
The output (7) indicates the undetectable/stealthy property.
C. Control Objective
We recall the definition of second-order consensus to
review the control objective.
Definition 2: [27] The second-order consensus in the
multi-agent system (1) is achieved if for any initial condition:
lim
t→∞
|xi (t)− xj (t)| = 0, (9a)
lim
t→∞
|vi (t)− vj (t)| = 0, ∀i, j = 1, . . . , n. (9b)
We recall our proposed simplified control protocol that works
for consensus in the environment of dynamic topology.
ui(t) =
∑
j∈V
a
σ(t)
ij (xj (t)− xi (t)), i ∈ V (10)
where σ(t) : [t0,∞) → S , {1, . . . , s}, is the switching
signal of the interaction topology of the communication net-
work; a
σ(t)
ij is the entry of the weighted adjacency matrix that
describes the activated topology of communication graph.
D. Strategy on Switching Times
The following time-dependent topology switching is the
building block of our defense strategy.
Lemma 1: [20] Consider the second-order multi-agent
system (1) with control protocol (10). For the given topology
set S that satisfies
∀r ∈ S :
√
λi (Lr)
λj (Lr) ∈ Q, for ∀i, j = 2, . . . , |V| (11)
and the scalars 1 > β > 0, α > 0 and κ ∈ N, if the dwell
times τr, r ∈ S, satisfy
τr = τ̂max +m
Tr
2
,m ∈ N (12)
where 0 < τ̂max <
− ln β
α
, 0 < τ̂max+
mTr
2 −
(
β−
1
κ − 1
)
κ
α−ξ ,
ξ < α, ξ = max
r∈S,i=1,...,n
{1− λi (Lr),−1 + λi (Lr)} and Tr
= lcm
(
2pi√
λi(Lr)
; i = 2, ..., n
)
, then the asymptotic second-
order consensus (9) is achieved.
Remark 2: For the control protocol, with undirected com-
munication topology, that replies on both relative positions
and velocities measurements, its obvious advantage is that
there is no constraint on the magnitudes of coupling weights
[1]. The switching scheme proposed in Lemma 1 almost
maintains this advantage since it only requires the rations
of non-zero Laplacian eigenvalues to be rational numbers.
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
For simplicity, we let the increasingly ordered set M ,
{1, 2, . . .} ⊆ V denote the set of observed outputs. We
usually refer to an agent under attack as a misbehaving
agent [12]. We let K ⊆ V denote the set of misbehaving
agents.
Under time-dependent topology switching, the multi-agent
system in (1) with the control input (10) in the presence of
attack and the observed outputs of positions can be written
as
˙˜xi(t) = v˜i(t) (13a)
˙˜vi(t) =
∑
i∈V
a
σ(t)
ij (x˜j(t)−x˜i(t)) +
{
g˜i(t), i∈K
0, i∈V\K (13b)
y˜i(t) = x˜i(t).i∈M (13c)
The system in (13) can be equivalently rewritten in the
form of a switched system under attack:
˙˜z (t) = Aσ(t)z˜ (t) + g˜ (t) (14a)
y˜ (t) = Cz˜(t), (14b)
where
z˜ (t),
[
x˜1 (t) . . . x˜|V| (t) v˜1 (t) . . . v˜|V| (t)
]⊤
, (15a)
Aσ(t),
[
0|V|×|V| 1|V|×|V|
−Lσ(t) 0|V|×|V|
]
, (15b)
C,
[
diag{1, . . . , 1} 0|M|×(|V|−|M|)
]
, (15c)
g˜(t),
[
0
⊤
|V| g¯
⊤(t)
]⊤
, (15d)
[g¯ (t)]i,
{
g˜i (t) , i ∈ K
0, i ∈ V\K. (15e)
In addition, we consider the system (14) in the absence of
attacks, which is given by
z˙ (t) = Aσ(t)z (t) , (16a)
y (t) = Cz(t). (16b)
To end this section, we make the following assumptions
on the attacker and the defender (system operator).
Assumption 1: The attacker
1) knows the currently activated topology and its dwell
time at switching time;
2) has the memory of the past switching sequences.
Assumption 2: The defender
1) designs the switching sequences including switching
times and topologies;
2) has no knowledge of the attack-starting time;
3) has no knowledge of the number of misbehaving
agents.
IV. DETECTABILITY OF ZERO-DYNAMICS ATTACK
This section focuses on the detectability of ZDA, which
will answer the question: what topologies of multi-agent
system (13) to strategically switch to such that the attack
policy (5) is not feasible?
To better illustrate the strategy on switching topologies,
we introduce the definition of components in a graph.
Definition 3 (Components of Graph [28]): The
components of a graph G are its maximal connected
subgraphs. A component is said to be trivial if it has no
edges; otherwise, it is a nontrivial component.
Remark 3: As illustrated by Difference Graph in Fig. 1,
different components do have any common vertex, otherwise
they are in the same component formed via that common
vertex.
Definition 4: The difference graph Grsdiff = (V
rs
diff,E
rs
diff) of
two graphs Gr and Gs is generated as
Vrsdiff = Vr ∪ Vs
(i, j) ∈ Ersdiff, if arij − asij 6= 0
Fig. 1. Components of difference graph (the weights of communications
links are uniformly set as ones).
where Vr and a
r
ij are the set of agents and the entry of
weighted adjacency matrix of the graph Gr, respectively.
We define the union difference graph for switching differ-
ence graphs:
Gdiff ,
 ⋃
r,s∈S
Vrsdiff,
⋃
r,s∈S
Ersdiff
 . (17)
We use Ci(Gdiff) to denote the set of agents in the i
th
component of union difference graph Gdiff. Obviously, V =
C1
⋃
C2
⋃
. . .
⋃
Cd, and Cp
⋂
Cq = ∅ if p 6= q, where
d is the number of the component of difference graph Gdiff.
The detectability of ZDA under strategy on switching
topologies are presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: [24] Consider the multi-agent system (14).
Under time-dependent topology switching, the ZDA can be
detected by defender without knowledge of misbehaving
agents and the attack-starting time, if and only if at least
one agent in each component of union difference graph has
observed output, i.e.,
Ci(Gdiff) ∩M 6= ∅, ∀i = 1, . . . d. (18)
V. ATTACK DETECTION ALGORITHM
Based on the obtained detectability of ZDA, this section
focus on its detection algorithm.
A. Luenberger Observer under Switching Topology
We now present a Luenberger observer for the system (13):
x˙i (t) = vi (t) (19a)
v˙i (t) =
∑
i∈V
a
σ(t)
ij (xj(t)− xi(t))
−
{
ψiri(t)+θir˙i(t), i∈M
0, i∈V\M (19b)
ri(t) = xi(t)− y˘i (t) , i∈M (19c)
where y˜i(t) is the observed output in system (13), ri (t) is
the attack-detection signal, ψi and θi are the observer gains
designed by the defender (system operator).
The strategy (16) in Theorem 1 implies that if the union
difference graph is connected, i.e., the union difference graph
has only one component, using only one agent’s observed
output is sufficient to detect ZDA. The following result re-
garding the stability of system (19) will answer the question:
whether only one agent’s observed output is sufficient for the
observer to asymptotically track the system (14) in the absent
of attack?
Theorem 2: [24] Consider the following matrix:
As ,
[
0n×n 1n×n
−Ls − Φ −Θ
]
, (20)
where
Φ , diag{ψ1, . . . , ψ|M|, 0, . . . , 0}, (21a)
Θ , diag{θ1, . . . , θ|M|, 0, . . . , 0}. (21b)
Given that Ls is the Laplacian matrix of a connected graph
and the gain matrices Φ and Θ satisfy
0n×n 6= Φ ≥ 0, (22a)
0n×n 6= Θ ≥ 0, (22b)
then As is Hurwitz for any |M| ≥ 1, if and only if Ls has
distinct eigenvalues.
B. Strategic Switching Topology For Detection
The strategic topology-switching algorithm is described by
Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3: [24] Consider the multi-agent system (14)
and the observer (19), where the observer gain matrices Φ
and Θ satisfy (22a) and (22b), and the topology-switching
signal σ˜(tk) of the observer (19) and the system (14) are
generated by Algorithm 1.
i) Without knowledge of the misbehaving agents and
the attack-starting time, the observer (19) is able to
detect ZDA in system (14), i.e., r(t) ≡ 0|M| does
not holds, if and only if the set of observed outputs
and switching topologies satisfy (18).
ii) In the absence of attacks, without constraint on
the magnitudes of observer gains, the observer (19)
asymptotically track the real system (13).
iii) In the absence of attacks, the agents in system (14)
achieve the asymptotic second-order consensus.
Algorithm 1: Strategic Topology-Switching Algorithm
Input: Initial index k = 0, initial time tk = 0, an
ordered topology set S that satisfies
∃s ∈ S : Ls has distinct eigenvalues, (23)
dwell times τs, s ∈ S, generated by (12) that
satisfy∑
s∈S
νsµP (As) < 0, νs = τs∑
r∈S
τr
. (24)
1 Run the multi-agent system (14) and the observer (19);
2 Switch topology of system (13) and its observer (19) at
time tk + τσ˜(tk): σ˜(tk)← S (mod(k + 1, |S|) + 1);
3 Update topology-switching time: tk ← tk + τσ˜(tk);
4 Update index: k ← k + 1;
5 Go to Step 2.
VI. SIMULATION
We consider a system with n = 4 agents. The initial
position and velocity conditions are chosen randomly as
x(0) = v(0) = [1, 2, 3, 4]
⊤
. The considered network topolo-
gies with their coupling weights are given in Fig. 2, which
shows that all of the four agents are under attack, i.e.,
K = {1, 2, 3, 4}. We let agent 1 provide observed output,
i.e., M = {1}. We set the observer gains significantly small
as Φ = Θ = diag{10−6, 0, 0, 0}.We note that in the working
situation illustrated by Fig. 2, the existing results [10]–[14]
for the multi-agent systems under fixed topology fail to
detect ZDA. This is mainly due to the misbehaving-agents
set |K| = 4; the connectivities of Topologies One, Two and
Three are as the same as 1; and the output set |M| = 1.
All these violate the conditions on the connectivity of the
communication network, the size of the misbehaving-agent
set, and the size of the output set.
Fig. 2. Working situation.
First, we consider the topology set S = {1, 2}, and set
the topology switching sequence as 1 → 2 → 1 → 2 →
. . ., periodically. We verify from Fig. 2 that the topology set
S = {1, 2} satisfies (11) and (24). By Lemma 1, we select
the dwell times τ1 = τ2 =
T1
2 +0.2 =
T2
2 +0.2 =
pi
2 +0.2. It
can be verified from Topologies One and Two in Fig. 2 that
their generated difference graph is disconnected. Thus, the
setS = {1, 2} does not satisfy (18) in Theorem 1. Therefore,
the attacker can easily design a ZDA such that Algorithm 1
fails to detect it. Following the policy (5), one of the stealthy
attack strategies is designed as:
• η = 0.0161;
• modify the data of initial condition sent to observer (19)
as x̂ (0) = [1, 1, 3, 5]
⊤
and v̂ (0) = [1, 1, 4, 4]
⊤
;
• choose attack-starting time ρ = 1097.4;
• introduce ZDA signal to system at ρ:
g (t)=10−3
[
0, 7.3eη(t−ρ), 7.3eη(t−ρ),−14.6eη(t−ρ)]⊤.
0 500 1097.4 1500
Time
-2
0
2
4
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8
10
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Fig. 3. States v˜(t): multi-agent system under attack is unstable; attack-
detection signal r(t): the attacker keep stealthy over time.
The trajectories of detection signal r(t) designed in (19),
and the velocities are shown in Fig. 3, which illustrates that
the attacker’s goal of making the system unstable without
being detected is achieved under the topology set S =
{1, 2}.
To detect the designed stealthy attack, we now incorporate
Topology Three in Fig. 2 into topology set, i.e., S =
{1, 2, 3}. We let the topology switching sequence to be
1 → 2 → 3 → 1 → 2 → 3 → . . ., periodically. We
verify that the topology set S = {1, 2, 3} satisfies (11)
and (24). Using Lemma 1, the dwell times are selected as
τ1 = τ2 = τ3 =
pi
2+0.2. It can be verified from Fig. 2 that the
difference graph generated by Topologies One and Three, or
Topologies Two and Three is connected. Thus, by property
i) in Theorem 3, we conclude that using only one agent’s
observed output, the strategic topology-switching algorithm–
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Detect Mixed Stealthy Attacks
Attack that modifies initial condition is detected.
Attack-starting time of zero-dynamics attack is  = 1097.4.
Zero-dynamics attack is detected.
Fig. 4. Attack-detection signal r(t): using only one agent’s observed
outputs, the designed ZDA is detected.
Algorithm 1, is able to detect the designed ZDA under the
topology set S = {1, 2, 3}. The trajectory of the attack-
detection signal r(t) in Fig. 4 illustrates that with all of the
agents being misbehaving, using only one agent’s observed
outputs, Algorithm 1 succeeds in detecting the mixed stealthy
attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a strategy on switching topolo-
gies that addresses the problem: what topology to switch to,
such that the ZDA can be detected. Based on the strategy, a
defense strategy is derived. The theoretical results obtained in
this paper imply a rather interesting result: for the dwell time
of switching topologies, there exist a tradeoff between the
switching cost and the duration of attacks going undetected,
and the convergence speed to consensus. Analyzing the trade-
off problems in the lights of game theory and multi-objective
optimization constitutes a part of our future research.
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